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Zika virus (ZIKV) exhibits unique transmission dynamics in that it is
concurrently spread by a mosquito vector and through sexual con-
tact. We show that this sexual component of ZIKV transmission in-
duces novel processes on networks through the highly asymmetric
durations of infectiousness between males and females – it is esti-
mated that males are infectious for periods up to ten times longer
than females – leading to an asymmetric percolation process on
the network of sexual contacts. We exactly solve the properties of
this asymmetric percolation on random sexual contact networks and
show that this process exhibits two epidemic transitions correspond-
ing to a core-periphery structure. This structure is not present in the
underlying contact networks, which are not distinguishable from ran-
dom networks, and emerges because of the asymmetric percolation.
We provide an exact analytical description of this double transition
and discuss the implications of our results in the context of ZIKV epi-
demics. Most importantly, our study suggests a bias in our current
ZIKV surveillance as the community most at risk is also one of the
least likely to get tested.
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Abstract modeling of epidemics on networks remains anactive field because some of the most basic features of
epidemics are still misunderstood. The classic model is quite
simple (1): disease spreads stochastically, with a fixed trans-
mission probability, T , through contacts around a given patient
zero. The outbreak dies quickly if T is too small, but spreads
to a macroscopic fraction S of the entire population if T is
larger than a threshold Tc. At Tc, most of the typical insights
from phase transition theory are valuable. For instance, the
sizes of microscopic outbreaks follow a power-law distribu-
tion such that the expected size of microscopic outbreaks, 〈s〉,
indicates the position of a phase transition. Indeed, as T
increases, 〈s〉 monotonically increases, diverges exactly at Tc,
and then monotonically goes down; meanwhile the expected
macroscopic epidemic size, S, starts increasing monotonically
at Tc.
However, simple modifications to this model can dramat-
ically alter its phenomenology. The epidemic threshold can
vanish in networks with a scale-free degree distribution (2)
or in growing networks (3). The phase transition can be dis-
continuous in the case of complex contagions with threshold
exposition or reinforcement (4), interacting epidemics (5, 6),
or adaptive networks (7–9). Recently, a unique phenomenon
of double phase transitions has also been observed numeri-
cally when networks have a very heterogeneous and clustered
structure (10, 11).
The current Zika virus (ZIKV) epidemic exhibits two unique
properties. First, while the main transmission pathway for
ZIKV is through a mosquito vector (predominantly Aedes
aegypti or Aedes albopictus (13, 14)), a feature which has
its own type of well-studied model and behavior (14–16), it
can also spread through sexual contacts (17, 18). Second,
the probability of sexual transmission is highly asymmetric
between males and females. Although this is also true for
other sexually transmitted infections such as HIV (19), it
reaches an extreme level of asymmetry in the case of ZIKV.
Indeed, males can be infectious for over 180 days (20) while
females are infectious for less than 20 days (21). Assuming a
symmetric risk of transmission per contact, males would be
10 times more likely to transmit to a partner than females.
This is, however, a rather conservative estimate since male-to-
female transmissions tend to be more likely than the opposite
(19, 22).
The dynamics of the ZIKV epidemic is well understood
in countries where the vector-borne pathway dominates (23).
However, with travelers moving to and from endemic regions,
the potential of ZIKV as an emerging STI in regions without
the mosquito vector remains to be fully assessed. Indeed, with
only few reported cases of sexual transmission of ZIKV – in-
cluding male-to-male, male-to-female, and female-to-male (18)
– the scientific community still struggles to reach a consensus
on the impact of sexual transmission of ZIKV (24, 25). It is
therefore imperative to investigate the extent to which canoni-
cal knowledge about emerging infectious diseases applies to
the threat assessment of ZIKV as an STI.
We model the ZIKV sexual transmission through asym-
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Fig. 1. Emergence of the second transition as asymmetry increases. The solid lines show the expected fraction of the population in the extensive component (S, left axis).
The dashed lines show the average size of small, non-extensive components (〈s〉, right axis). The divergence of the average size of small components marks the phase
transition after which the extensive components grows with the transmission probability T . The vertical dotted black lines show the thresholds. (left) With a small asymmetry
between transmission values {Tij} as a function of node types, we recover the classic epidemic transition. (right) With a larger asymmetry, a second peak in the average size
of small components appears. The first, T (1)c , corresponds to the global epidemic threshold of the population. The second, T
(2)
c , corresponds to the invasion of the large
heterosexual subpopulation. The threshold T (1)c corresponds to the value of T such that the largest eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix of Eq. (1) equals 1. The second
threshold T (2)c is obtained similarly but with the probability of transmission between homosexual males set to zero. The homo-/bi-/heterosexual subpopulations represent 5%,
3% and 92%, respectively and are equally split between males and females. The degrees are distributed according to a Poisson distribution, pk = e−〈k〉〈k〉k/k!, with an
average degree, 〈k〉, equal to 5. See Supporting Information for further details.
metric percolation on random sexual contact networks and
solve it exactly using a multitype (multivariate) generating
function formalism (26). We then show how the asymmetric
percolation leads to a double transition. Interestingly, the
formulation of our model allows us to provide a first analytic
framework for the aforementioned numerical results on double
transitions. More importantly, this allows us to identify two
different thresholds for ZIKV to be endemic as an STI in re-
gions where the mosquito vector is absent, but where travellers
to/from endemic regions can spark a sexual epidemic when
they return/visit. We also find that, in the large interval of
parameter space between those two thresholds, the asymmet-
ric percolation creates a core-periphery structure in a system
where there was none. Finally, we discuss the implications of
this core-periphery structure for the surveillance and control
of the ZIKV epidemic, and provide policy guidelines.
Results
Inspired by the sexual transmission of ZIKV, we investigate the
effect of asymmetry on bond percolation on networks, and show
that it yields outcomes akin to the double phase transitions
observed numerically in other contexts (10, 11). To isolate the
effect of asymmetry alone and thus provide a clear proof of
concept, we consider a very simple model in which nodes be-
long to one of 6 types based on their sex and sexual orientation
(i.e., female/male and homo-/bi-/heterosexual). Each node is
assigned a number of contacts, k, independently of its type
(i.e., all nodes have the same degree distribution {pk}k≥0),
and links are created randomly via a simple stub-matching
scheme constrained by the sexual orientations (12, 26). For
instance, bisexual males choose their partners randomly in the
pools of heterosexual females, bisexual males and females, and
homosexual males. This implies that there is no correlation
between the type of a node and its number of contacts, and
consequently no core-periphery structure. In fact, this model
generates well-mixed contact networks that are indistinguish-
able from networks generated with the configuration model
and the same degree distribution (see Supporting Information).
While these networks are originally undirected, asymmetric
percolation implies that links can be more likely to exist (i.e.,
transmit) in one direction than in the other, thus inducing an
effective semi-directed structure to the networks (27). In other
words, Tij 6= Tji in general, with Tij being the probability
of transmission from a node of type i to a node of type j
(hereafter we denote N the set of the six possible types of
nodes). In particular, we set Tij = T for every i, j ∈ N
except when i corresponds to a female, in which case we set
Tij = T/a to enforce asymmetric probabilities of transmission
(i.e., females are a times less likely to transmit ZIKV than
males).
We adapt the formalism presented in Ref. (26) to compute
the epidemic threshold and the expected final size of outbreaks
in the limit of large networks. It is worth pointing out that
since asymmetric percolation (i.e., whenever a 6= 1) induces
an effective semi-directed structure to the networks, the prob-
ability for the existence of an extensive connected component
(i.e, an epidemic) does not equal to its relative size as for
symmetric, traditional bond percolation (i.e., a = 1). Here we
focus on the relative size for the sake of conciseness; we refer
the readers to the Supporting Information for full details of
the analysis and numerical validation.
To obtain the relative size of the extensive component, we
define vi as the probability that a neighbor of type i is not in
the extensive component, which we solve by a self-consistent
argument. If the neighbor of a node is not in the extensive
component, then none of its other neighbors should be in it
either. The probability that the neighbor has a degree equal
to k being kpk/〈k〉, with 〈k〉 =
∑
k
kpk, this self-consistent
1.00 1.02 1.04 1.06 1.08 1.10 1.12
Asymmetry (a)
0.200
0.205
0.210
0.215
0.220
Th
re
sh
ol
d
Full population (T (1)c )
No MSM transmission (T (2)c )
MSM unipartite (T (3)c )
Hetero. bipartite (T (4)c )
MSM (w/o bisexuals, T (5)c )
Hetero. (w/o bisexuals, T (6)c )
2 4 6 8 10 12
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Fig. 2. Separation of thresholds with increasing asymmetry. We show the two
thresholds (critical points) T (1)c and T
(2)
c discussed in the main text (solid lines), as
well as the thresholds for different subpopulations (dotted lines) which can be easily
calculated and further support our interpretation of the phenomenology. The first
threshold, T (1)c , corresponds to the epidemic threshold for the full population. The
second threshold, T (2)c , is computed by setting the transmission between men-having-
sex-with-men (MSM) to zero. The “MSM unipartite” and “Hetero. bipartite” lines show
the epidemic threshold should the network be only populated with MSM or hetero-
sexuals, respectively. They are defined as 〈k〉eT (3)c = 1 and [〈k〉eT (4)c ]2/a = 1,
where 〈k〉e = 〈k(k− 1)〉/〈k〉 is the average excess degree of the nodes (12). The
last two thresholds correspond to the contributions to T (1)c and T
(2)
c that involve
exclusively the homosexual male or heterosexual subpopulations, respectively. They
are the solutions of α0|0〈k〉eT (5)c = 1 and α4|5α5|4[〈k〉eT (6)c ]2/a = 1, where
nodes of type 0, 4 and 5 correspond to homosexual males, heterosexual males and
heterosexual females, respectively. These results therefore support the interpretation
that the first threshold corresponds to the invasion of the MSM subpopulation (with
T (3)c and T
(5)
c acting as lower and upper bounds), and that the second threshold
is due to the invasion of the remaining population (with T (4)c and T
(6)
c acting as
lower and upper bounds). The inset shows the growing separation of the two main
thresholds as asymmetry increases to values close to what we expect for ZIKV. The
same parameters as in Fig. 1 were used.
argument can be written as
vi =
∑
k
kpk
〈k〉
[∑
j∈N
αj|i(1− Tji + Tjivj)
]k−1
. [1]
where αj|i is the probability that a neighbor of a node of type i
is of type j (i.e.,
∑
j
αj|i = 1 for any i). Solving this equation
for every i ∈ N , the probability that a node of type i is part
of the extensive component, Si, corresponds to the probability
that at least one of its neighbors is in it as well
Si = 1−
∑
k
pk
[∑
j∈N
αj|i(1− Tji + Tjivj)
]k
. [2]
The relative size of the extensive component is then S =∑
i∈N wiSi, where wi is the fraction of the nodes that are of
type i. Below the epidemic or percolation threshold, every vi
is equal to 1 since there is no extensive component. The per-
colation threshold corresponds to the point where the largest
eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix of Eq. (1) equals 1.
The distribution of the composition of the small, non-
extensive components can be computed in a similar fashion
(see Supporting Information for full details). Let us define the
probability generating function (pgf) Hi(x) whose coefficients
correspond to the probability that a neighbor of type i leads
to a small component of a given composition (i.e., the number
of nodes of type j is given by the exponent of xj). Invoking
the same self-consistency argument as above, the pgfs are the
solution of
Hi(x) = xi
∑
k
kpk
〈k〉
[∑
j∈N
αj|i[1− Tij + TijHj(x)]
]k−1
, [3]
where the extra xi has been added to account for the neighbor
of type i itself. Similarly, the small component that can be
reached from a node of type i is therefore given by
Ki(x) = xi
∑
k
pk
[∑
j∈N
αj|i[1− Tij + TijHj(x)]
]k
. [4]
The distribution of the composition of the small components is
K(x) =
∑
i∈N wiKi(x). It is worth noting that whenever S >
0, the distribution generated by K(x) is no longer normalized,
K(1) < 1, such that the average number of nodes of type i in
the small components is
〈si〉 = 1
K(1)
dK(x)
dxi
∣∣∣∣
x=1
. [5]
An example of the general phenomenology is shown in
Fig. 1. Unlike the classic epidemic transition picture, where
〈s〉 diverges at the epidemic threshold where the macroscopic
epidemic emerges, we now find two peaks in 〈s〉. This double
transition is similar to numerical results from Ref. (10), but
here observed without the need for either strong clustering
nor heterogeneity in degree distribution. In fact, we used the
homogeneous Poisson degree to ensure that the asymmetry
in the transmission is the only salient feature of the model.
Interestingly, as shown in Fig. 2, T (1)c and T (2)c are virtually
equal for small values of the asymmetry. As asymmetry in-
creases, the peak separates thus yielding a double transition
corresponding to an effective core-periphery organization in
the network of infections. The core then corresponds to the
men-having-sex-with-men (MSM) population where infections
are more frequent than in the remaining population. Figure 3
shows the network of who infected whom for two values of
T . For T (1)c < T < T (2)c , the extensive component is mostly
composed of one type of nodes and any spillover in the other
types quickly dies out. However, at T = T (2)c , these spillovers
now cause cascades into other types with truncated power-law
distributed sizes (see Fig. 4). For T > T (2)c , the extensive
component recovers the well-mixed structure of the original
underlying network.
Altogether, the second peak in the average size of outbreaks,
〈s〉, corresponds to a transition between subcritical and super-
critical spillover in a less susceptible sub-population, but not
to a second phase transition in the classic sense. Indeed, the
analytical nature of our results allows confirm the null critical
exponent observed in Ref. (10) for the scaling of the height
of the second susceptibility peak with regards to system size.
Even in the infinite system considered by our calculations, the
peak saturates, which is the only possible outcome for a system
whose order parameter is already non-zero. Interestingly, a
critical power-law-like behavior is nonetheless observed in the
heterosexual population at both thresholds. Moreover, our
results suggest that the asymmetry in transmission probability
is reflected in the asymmetric prevalence within the male and
Fig. 3. Composition of the components as the transmissibility increases. Nodes corresponding to males and females are shown in blue and orange, respectively, and
arrows indicate who infected whom. The same parameters as for Fig. 1 have been used with asymmetry a = 10. (left) At T (1)c < T = 0.45 < T
(2)
c , the infection mostly
follows the MSM sub-population with minimal and sub-critical spillovers in the remaining population. (right) At T = T (2)c ' 0.632, the spillover causes cascades of power-law
distributed sizes into the heterosexual population.
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Fig. 4. Distribution of the size and composition of small components. (left) We find power-law scaling of small outbreak sizes with scaling exponent−3/2, as expected
from classic phase transition theory (12), at both T (1)c and T
(2)
c . However, unlike classic phase transitions, only the tail of the distribution follows a power-law at T
(1)
c , while at
T (2)c we find a robust power-law over many orders of magnitude before the distribution falls with the expected exponential cut-off. This cut-off goes to infinity when the size
of the MSM community goes to zero, in which case T (2)c now becomes the prominent critical point. Notice that the size of the components goes back to an homogeneous
distribution in-between the two epidemic thresholds. (upper right) At T (1)c , the power-law tail in the component size distribution is mainly due to the critical core of homosexual
males while the exponential behavior is mainly due to heterosexuals. The power-law tail in the distributions of heterosexuals is due to spillovers from the critical core. (lower
right) At T (2)c , the power-law portion of the distribution is due to heterosexuals now forming a critical core while homosexual males, being already almost exclusively in the
extensive component, do not contribute. All curves were obtained by solving Eq. (4) with asymmetry a = 3 and the parameters given in the caption of Fig. 1.
female heterosexual populations, which is reminiscent of recent
empirical results (28).
Based on our results, we can summarize the phase diagram
of the ZIKV epidemic in 3 possible outcomes. First, with
T < T
(1)
c , all outbreaks are microscopic, quickly die out, and
mostly infect MSM. Second, with T (1)c < T < T (2)c , we now
see a macroscopic epidemic within the network of homosexual
contacts between males, with microscopic spill-over into the
rest of the population via bisexual males. Third, with T > T (2)c ,
we now find a more classic epidemic scenario in the sense that
it is of macroscopic scale in most of the population. It is also
worth mentioning that this phenomenology is robust to the
presence of multiple infectious seeds sparking outbreaks (see
Supporting Information). Our results are thus valid beyond
ZIKV for any infections with asymmetry in probabilities of
direct transmission, regardless of whether or not there is also
vector transmission.
Discussion
We developed a network model of ZIKV transmission highlight-
ing the importance of asymmetric sexual transmission between
males and females. We find a double transition generated by
a core group of MSM that could maintain ZIKV transmission
without the presence of a viable mosquito vector, such as in
regions where people may have brought back ZIKV with them
after a trip to endemic regions. These results are unique as
previous models showing double transitions relied on the need
for strong clustering and heterogeneity in degree distribution.
Our study carries important consequences for the ongoing
ZIKV epidemic and stresses the large knowledge gap in the
sexual transmission of ZIKV (25). The aim of our work is to
present the epidemiological consequences of possible sustained
sexual transmission. While there are many unknowns, recent
work demonstrates a) multiple anecdotal cases of sexual trans-
mission of ZIKV in humans (25, 29–31), b) multiple separate
animal models demonstrating sexual transmission (32–34), c)
strong asymmetries between durations of ZIKV shedding in
semen and vaginal secretions (20, 21), and d) differential risk
between sexes for ZIKV infection in sexually active popula-
tions. Indeed, recent work has identified 90% more ZIKV
infections in women between 15 and 65 than men of the same
age in Rio de Janero (28) adjusted for gender-related health-
seeking behavior and pregnancy status. Importantly, this risk
difference was not seen in women less than 15 years of age
or greater than 65, indicating the potentially large impact of
sexual transmission of ZIKV in a country with known ongoing
vectored transmission of ZIKV. A similar situation has also
been observed in Colombia (35) and in the Dominican Repub-
lic (36). While more research on the epidemiological impacts
and basic biology of sexual ZIKV transmission is needed, there
is compelling need to be prepared with epidemiological studies
examining transmission on a population-scale.
We demonstrated that potential ZIKV persistence in MSM,
even if barely critical within that sub-population, could cause
subcritical but dramatic spillover into the heterosexual com-
munity. ZIKV infections in adults are largely asymptomatic
(37) and, therefore, most testing occurs in the roughly 20% of
cases that are symptomatic or in individuals seeking to have
children (38). The vast majority of these individuals will be
outside of the MSM community (38). This means that the
community most at risk is also one of the least likely to get
tested. To avoid underestimating the spread of ZIKV, it is
therefore important for health officials and policy makers to
keep its unique behavior and phenomenology in mind.
Given the extent of foreign travel to locations endemic
with ZIKV, public health practitioners should be aware of
the potential for infectious introduction into local MSM com-
munities. Travel history as well as sexual history should be
employed when evaluating an occult fever. Cities which have
a viable vector for ZIKV should be doubly aware of the po-
tential transmission routes of ZIKV. As it stands, current
estimates of the basic reproductive number, R0, of ZIKV may
be too low as they fail to account for sustained sexual trans-
mission (17, 18, 39, 40). Important future work will be to
accurately estimate R0 of ZIKV across various settings with
differing sexual practices and mosquito fauna.
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The analytical approach used in the main text is an adaptation of a more general formalism
presented in Ref. [1]. We derive in more details its equations, validate its predictions with
numerical simulations, and demonstrate some of the claims made in the main text. We
also provide further details about the parameters used in the calculations. Finally, the
general phenomenology and the results presented in the main text are further validated with
simulations using realistic data.
The formalism presented in Ref. [1] is a generalization of the configuration model [2] in which nodes and
connections are distinguished via types of nodes and stubs (i.e., half-links that are connected to create motifs).
We consider a case in which there are 6 types of nodes based on the sex and sexual orientation of individuals
(i.e., female/male and homo-/bi-/heterosexual). We denote the set of such types N and say that a fraction wi of
all nodes are of type i. Each node is assigned a number of contacts, k, independently of its type (i.e., all nodes
have the same degree distribution {pk}k≥0), and links are created by randomly matching stubs respecting sexual
orientations. Mathematically, this is encoded in the conditional probabilities {αj|i}i,j∈N giving the probability
that a link leaving a node of type i leads to a node of type j (see Sec. C for their numerical values). These
probabilities are subjected to the constraints∑
l∈N
αl|i = 1 ; αj|iwi = αi|jwj , (S1)
for every i, j ∈ N . The latter constraint is due to the undirected nature of links and implies that there are as much
links running from nodes of type i towards nodes of type j than in the opposite direction. Note that since nodes
are only connected via links, the set of types of stubs is the same as the set of nodes and need not be considered
explicitly (see Sec. IV of Ref. [1]).
Because links are created randomly, the probability that a node of type i and degree k has a set of k := {kj}j∈N
neighbors of each type is simply
P (k|i, k) := k!∏
j∈N kj !
∏
j∈N
[
αj|i
]kj (S2)
with the constraint that
∑
j∈N kj = k. Given that links running from nodes of type i to nodes of type j are
independently removed with probability 1 − Tij , the probability that a node of type i and original degree k has
m neighbors is
P (m|i, k) :=
∑
k≥m
P (k|i, k)
∏
j∈N
(
kj
mj
)
T
mj
ij (1− Tij)kj−mj , (S3)
2where the summation runs over kj ≥ mj for every j ∈ N . The multivariate generating function associated with
the joint degree distribution for nodes of type i is
gi(x) :=
∑
k
pk
∑
m
P (m|i, k)
∏
j∈N
x
mj
j
=
∑
k
pk
∑
m
∑
k≥m
P (k|i, k)
∏
j∈N
(
kj
mj
)
[Tijxj ]
mj (1− Tij)kj−mj
=
∑
k
pk
∑
k
P (k|i, k)
∏
j∈N
kj∑
mj=0
(
kj
mj
)
[Tijxj ]
mj (1− Tij)kj−mj
=
∑
k
pk
∑
k
k!∏
j∈N kj !
∏
j∈N
[
αj|i
]kj kj∑
mj=0
(
kj
mj
)
[Tijxj ]
mj (1− Tij)kj−mj
=
∑
k
pk
∑
k
k!∏
j∈N kj !
∏
j∈N
[
αj|i
]kj [1− Tij + Tijxj ]kj
=
∑
k
pk
∑
j∈N
αj|i (1− Tij + Tijxj)
k (S4)
by virtue of the multinomial theorem. The probability that a node of type i has k nodes directly accessible (i.e.,
via an existing link) is the coefficient of gi(x) in front of
∏
j∈N x
kj
j ; hence we say that gi(x) generates the joint
degree distribution for nodes of type i. It is worth mentioning that disregarding the types of nodes [i.e., setting
xj = x and Tij = T for all i, j ∈ N ] in Eq. (S4) yields
g(x) =
∑
k
pk [1− T + Tx]k , (S5)
corresponding to the classical configuration model [2, 3]. In other words, even if distinguishing nodes into different
types appears to force correlations in the way they are connected, our approach generates well-mixed networks
that are structurally indistinguishable from networks generated with the configuration model and the same degree
distribution.
To compute the size of the components requires to know the excess degree of nodes: the number of new nodes
that can be reached from a node that has itself been reached via one of its links. The generating function associated
with this distribution, fli(x), can readily be obtained from Eq. (S4) as
fli(x) :=
[
∂gi(x)
∂xl
]−1
x=1
[
∂gi(x)
∂xl
]
=
∑
k
kpk
〈k〉
∑
j∈N
αj|i (1− Tij + Tijxj)
k−1 . (S6)
One striking result here is that fli(x) does not depend on the type of the node from which the node of type i has
been reached. This is a direct consequence of the multinomial form of Eq. (S2). Consequently, we define
fi(x) := fli(x) (S7)
for the remaining of the document.
A. Extensive (giant) component
With the generating function gi(x) and fi(x) in hand, we can already compute the size, composition and
probability of the extensive, giant component in the limit of large size networks. Let us define ui as the probability
3that a neighbor of type i does not lead to the giant component (i.e., regardless of the type of the node whose
neighbor is of type i). Because links are created by randomly matching stubs, we expect the networks generated
by our model to be locally tree-like in the limit of large networks for a great variety of degree distributions.
Consequently, the probabilities {ui}i∈N can be obtained via a simple self-consistent argument: if the neighbor of
type i mentioned above does not lead to the extensive component, then neither should its other neighbors. Since
the distribution of the number and of the type of these other neighbors is generated by fi(x), we directly have
that the {ui}i∈N are the solutions of
ui = fi(u) =
∑
k
kpk
〈k〉
∑
j∈N
αj|i (1− Tij + Tijuj)
k−1 (S8)
for every i ∈ N . Following the same line of thoughts, the probability that a randomly chosen node of type i leads
to the giant component is simply the complement of the probability that neither of its neighbors leads to it, or in
mathematical terms
Pi := 1− gi(u) = 1−
∑
k
pk
∑
j∈N
αj|i (1− Tij + Tijuj)
k . (S9)
The probability that any given node leads to the giant component is therefore
P :=
∑
i∈N
wiPi =
∑
i∈N
wi[1− gi(u)] = 1−
∑
i∈N
wi
∑
k
pk
∑
j∈N
αj|i (1− Tij + Tijuj)
k . (S10)
An important feature of asymmetric percolation on undirected networks – when links are undirected but the
probability of existence of links is asymmetric (i.e., that Tij 6= Tji from some i and j) – is that it is equivalent
to percolation on semi-directed networks. This implies that in general, the relative size of the giant component,
S, does not equal its probability of existence, P [1, 4]. In fact, while P is computed by looking at the fraction of
nodes that lead to the extensive component (i.e., extensive in-component), its relative size is obtained by looking
at the fraction of nodes that can be reached from the formers (i.e., extensive out-component). Since links in our
model are originally undirected, the relative size of the extensive component is obtained by simply switching the
probability of existence of links; Tij becomes Tji for all i, j ∈ N . Indeed, as explained in Sec. D, a neighbor of
type j can be reached from a node of type i with probability TijTji + Tij(1− Tji) = Tij , while the same neighbor
of type j can reach the node of type i with probability TijTji + Tji(1− Tij) = Tji. In other words, switching the
probability of existence of links effectively corresponds to switching from the out-degree to the in-degree. Let us
define vi as the probability that a node cannot be reached from the extensive component via a neighbor of type i,
and using the same self-consistency argument as above, we find that it is the solution of
vi =
∑
k
kpk
〈k〉
∑
j∈N
αj|i (1− Tji + Tjivj)
k−1 (S11)
for every i ∈ N . Similarly, the probability that a node of type i is not part of the extensive component, Si,
corresponds to the complement of the probability that none of its neighbors is part of it, or
Si := 1−
∑
k
pk
∑
j∈N
αj|i (1− Tji + Tjivj)
k , (S12)
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FIG. S1. Validation of the analytical calculations. The predictions (lines) of Eqs. (S8)–(S13) (left) and Eqs. (S21)–
(S24) (right) are compared with the results obtained from numerical simulations (symbols). Note that 〈s0〉 is shown using
a different axis to facilitate the comparison between the theoretical prediction and the results of the numerical simulations.
The asymmetry parameter is a = 10; details on the other parameters and numerical simualtions are given in Secs. C and D.
and the relative size of the extensive component is simply the fraction of nodes that can be reached from other
nodes in it, or
S :=
∑
i∈N
wiSi = 1−
∑
i∈N
wi
∑
k
pk
∑
j∈N
αj|i (1− Tji + Tjivj)
k . (S13)
Since the right-hand side of Eqs. (S8) and (S11) are convex and normalized polynomials, the values of {ui}i∈N and
{vi}i∈N can be obtained by iterating Eqs. (S8) and (S11) from an initial condition in [0, 1)|N | until convergence.
The predictions of Eqs. (S8)–(S13) are validated on Fig. S1.
B. Non-extensive (small) components
The distribution of the composition of the small, non-extensive components can be computed in a similar fash-
ion. Let us define the probability generating function (pgf) Hi(x) whose coefficients correspond to the probability
that a neighbor of type i leads to a small component of a given composition (i.e., the number of nodes of type j is
given by the exponent of xj). Invoking the same self-consistency argument as above, the pgfs are the solution of
Hi(x) = xi
∑
k
kpk
〈k〉
∑
j∈N
αj|i[1− Tij + TijHj(x)]
k−1 . (S14)
where the extra xi has been added to account for the neighbor of type i itself. Similarly, the small component
that can be reached from a node of type i is given by
Ki(x) := xi
∑
k
pk
∑
j∈N
αj|i[1− Tij + TijHj(x)]
k . (S15)
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FIG. S2. Validation of the analytical calculations. The marginal distributions for the size of the small components
predicted by Eqs. (S18)–(S20) (lines) are compared with the results obtained from numerical simulations (symbols). The
asymmetry parameter is a = 10; details on the other parameters and numerical simualtions are given in Secs. C and D.
The distribution of the composition of the small components is
K(x) :=
∑
i∈N
wiKi(x) =
∑
i∈N
wixi
∑
k
pk
∑
j∈N
αj|i[1− Tij + TijHj(x)]
k . (S16)
It is worth noting that whenever S > 0, the distribution generated by K(x) is no longer normalized, K(1) < 1,
since there is a non-zero probability that a given node does not lead to a finite component. In fact, a comparison
of Eqs. (S8)–(S10) with (S14)–(S16) yields the following relations
ui = Hi(1) ; Pi = 1−Ki(1) ; P = 1−K(1) . (S17)
for every i ∈ N .
Although the pgf K(x) generates the joint distribution of the number of nodes of each type in small components,
we are typically interested in its marginal distributions (i.e., the distribution of the number of nodes of a given
type). To obtain the distribution of the number of nodes of a given type, say type i, we simply set xj = δijz for
all j ∈ N in Eqs. (S14)–(S16). Similarly, if we are interested in the size of the components, that is the number of
nodes regardless of their type, we simply set xj = z for all j ∈ N . The marginal distribution for the number of
nodes in a component, P (s), is then
P (s) =
[
1
s!
∂s
∂zs
K(z)
K(1)
]
z=0
. (S18)
From Cauchy’s integral formula, this last expression can be written in terms of a path integral in the complex
plane
P (s) =
1
2ipiK(1)
∮
Γ
K(z)
zs+1
dz , (S19)
6where Γ is a closed circular path of radius r centered at the origin and in which K(z) is analytic. Substituting
z = re2ipiφ and discretizing the integral in smax equally spaced points, this last expression becomes
P (s) =
1
2ipiK(1)
∮
Γ
K(z)
zs+1
dz
=
1
rsK(1)
∫ 1
0
K
(
re2ipiφ
)
e−2ipisφdφ
' 1
smaxrsK(1)
smax−1∑
n=0
K
(
re2ipin/smax
)
e−2ipisn/smax , (S20)
where we identify the inverse discrete Fourier transform of the sequence {K(re2ipin/smax)} with n = 0, . . . , smax−1.
Although the exact form of K(z) is unknown, it is nevertheless possible to evaluate the sequence {K(re2ipin/smax)}
by solving Eqs. (S14)–(S16) and then to quickly obtain P (s) for s < smax with a single pass of the FFT algorithm.
This method is validated on Fig. S2.
The emergence of a critical cluster at the phase transition is associated with the divergence of the average size
of the small components
〈s〉 =
∑
i∈N
〈si〉 , (S21)
which can be computed from the marginal distributions obtained with the method explained above. However,
since P (s) ∼ s−3/2 at the phase transition [2], calculating 〈si〉 near the percolation threshold requires large values
of smax which make this method inefficient in practice. Luckily, there is another way to compute the average
number of nodes in small components without having to compute the marginal distribution beforehand. Since the
moments of a distribution can be obtained via a suitable differentiation of its associated pgf, the average number
of nodes of type i in small components can also be written as
〈si〉 = 1
K(1)
dK(x)
dxi
∣∣∣∣
x=1
. (S22)
Substituting Eq. (S16) in this equation yields
〈si〉 = wigi(u)
K(1)
+
〈k〉
K(1)
∑
j,l∈N
wjujαl|jTjl
∂Hl(1)
∂xi
, (S23)
where the equation for ∂Hl(1)∂xi is obtained via Eq. (S14)
∂Hl(1)
∂xi
= δilfl(u) +
∑
k
k(k − 1)pk
〈k〉
∑
j∈N
αj|l [1− Tlj + Tljuj ]
k−2
×
∑
j∈N
αj|lTlj
∂Hj(1)
∂xi
 , (S24)
for every i, l ∈ N . Consequently, the average number of nodes of each type in small components can be obtained
by solving Eq. (S24) for every combination of i, l ∈ N and then injecting the solutions in Eq. (S23). This approach
is validated on Fig. S1.
C. Choice of parameters
The proportion of each type of nodes, {wi}i∈N (see Table S1), used for the calculations are conservative yet
realistic estimates extrapolated from the data provided in Refs. [5–7] with respect to the conclusions discussed in
7Description Homo. males. Homo. females Bi. males Bi. females Hetero. males Hetero. females
i 0 1 2 3 4 5
wi 0.025 0.025 0.015 0.015 0.46 0.46
TABLE S1. Description of the node types and their relative proportion used in all calculations and numerical simulations.
the main text. The values chosen for the asymmetry parameter a (i.e., 3 and 10), are also either quite conservative
(3) or in line (10) with the naive estimates made from the infectious periods of males and females (see Introduction
in the main text). Moreover, although there is evidence that the probability of HIV transmission differs by sexual
act and insertive/receptor status (i.e., receptive anal sex could be as much as 20 times more likely to transmit HIV
than insertive vaginal sex, see Ref. [8]), we are not aware of any strong evidence suggesting that the probability
of transmission of ZIKV is different based on whether the receptor was male or female. We therefore opted for
a conservative approach and chose to use the same probability of transmission regardless of the gender of the
receiving partner (i.e., Tij does not depend on j), that is
Tij =
{
T if i is male
T/a if i is female
(S25)
for every j ∈ N . The use of fixed probabilities of transmission relies implicitly in the so-called i.i.d. assumption
introduced in Ref. [3] which ignores, due to coarse-graining, some correlations and heterogeneity associated with
the distribution of infectious periods. To understand the implications of the independent identically distributed
(i.i.d.) assumption, let us consider an individual of type i that is infectious for a period τ and that interacts with
one of its neighbors of type j at a rate β. The probability that this individual never infects its neighbor is
lim
δt→0
(1− βδt)τ/δt = e−βτ . (S26)
Assuming that τ and β are i.i.d. random variables respectively drawn from the distributions Pi(τ) and Qij(β),
the probability that any individual of type i eventually infects one of its neighbors of type j is
Tij = 1−
∫∫
e−βτPi(τ)Qij(β)dτdβ . (S27)
The i.i.d. assumption therefore implies that each infection event is independent for the other infection events,
even if these infection events all come from the same individual. However, although correlations in the infectious
period at the individual level are not taken into account, they are taken into account at the gender level since
the probability of transmission, Tij , corresponds to the probability that a node of type i will eventually infect
its neighbor of type j and, as such, is obtained by averaging over a distribution of infectious period, Pi(τ), that
depends explicitly on i. Since the asymmetry in the probability of transmission between men and women is mainly
due to men having longer infectious periods than women, the use of node types is expected to capture the relevant
heterogeneity in the infectious period with regards to the double transition phenomenology. In other words, the
i.i.d. assumption coupled with multiple types of nodes (i.e., the use of Tij instead of only one unique probability
of transmission T ) is sufficient to take into account that men are more likely to transmit ZIKV than women due
to their longer infectious periods. Adapting the frameworks developed in Refs. [9, 10] to multiple types of nodes
would get rid of the i.i.d. asumption but is not expected to alter the qualitative aspect of the double transition
phenomenology.
The values of {αj|i}i,j∈N are chosen to respect as much as possible the proportion of each type of nodes, {wi}i∈N
(see Table S1), given the constraints of Eqs. (S1). Taking the nodes of type 2 as a starting point, we set
α0|2 =
w0
w0 + w2 + w3 + w5
; α2|2 =
w2
w0 + w2 + w3 + w5
α3|2 =
w3
w0 + w2 + w3 + w5
; α5|2 =
w5
w0 + w2 + w3 + w5
,
8i \ j 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0.971 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 0.000 0.971 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.000
2 0.049 0.000 0.029 0.029 0.000 0.893
3 0.000 0.049 0.029 0.029 0.893 0.000
4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.971
5 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.971 0.000
TABLE S2. Values of αj|i used in all calculations and numerical simulations.
from which we can readily obtain the following from Eqs. (S1)
α2|0 =
w2α0|2
w0
; α2|3 =
w2α3|2
w3
; α2|5 =
w2α5|2
w5
: α0|0 = 1− α2|0
α4|5 = 1− α2|5 ; α5|4 =
w5α4|5
w4
; α3|4 = 1− α5|4 ; α4|3 =
w4α3|4
w3
.
Taking a similar point of view for nodes of type 3, but taking into account that α2|3 and α4|3 are already known,
we set
α1|3 =
[1− (α2|3 + α4|3)]w1
w1 + w3
; α3|3 =
[1− (α2|3 + α4|3)]w3
w1 + w3
,
from which we finally obtain
α3|1 =
w3α1|3
w1
; α1|1 = 1− α3|1 .
All other probabilities are set to zero. The values obtained using the parameters given in Table S1 are given in
Table S2.
D. Details on the numerical simulations
The analytical predictions of the model are validated by comparing them with results obtained from numerical
simulations in which networks are generated according to the stub matching scheme of Ref. [1]. More precisely,
106 nodes are first assigned a number of stubs, corresponding to their degree, drawn from a Poisson distribution
pk =
e−〈k〉〈k〉k
k!
(S28)
where k ≥ 0 and with an average degree 〈k〉 = 5. Stubs are then paired up to form links as follows.
1. The stubs assigned to each node are gathered in six lists of unmatched stubs (one list for each node type).
2. With probability
Rij =
wiαj|i
1 + δij
 ∑
m≥n∈N
wmαn|m
1 + δmn
−1 , (S29)
one stub attached to a node of type i and one stub attached to a node of type j are randomly chosen and
are matched to form a link. These stubs are then removed from their respective list.
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FIG. S3. Effect of multiple seeds. Behavior of Eq. (S30) for various values of N using the same parameters as in Fig. S1.
The two vertical dotted lines show the thresholds for the the two transitions as introduced in the main text.
3. Step 2 is repeated until every list is effectively empty (i.e., some stubs may remained unmatched due to
statistical fluctuations but their number is typically small enough such that the observables measured on
the generated networks are not affected).
The generated undirected network is then transformed into a semi-directed network as follows. A link between a
node of type i and a node of type j
- remains undirected with probability TijTji;
- becomes directed from the node of type i to the node of type j (i→ j) with probability Tij(1− Tji);
- becomes directed from the node of type j to the node of type i (j → i) with probability Tji(1− Tij);
- is removed with probability (1− Tij)(1− Tji).
This procedure is repeated for every link. The probability that a node of type i starts an epidemic, Pi, then
corresponds to the fraction of nodes of type i that are in the extensive in-component, and the probability that a
node of type i is infected during an epidemic, Si, corresponds to the fraction of nodes of type i that are in the
extensive out-component. Similarly, the average composition of outbreaks, 〈si〉 ∀i ∈ N , are obtained by looking
at the composition of non-extensive out-components.
Since the observables measured on Figs. S1 and S2 are self-averaging properties, the number of semi-directed
networks over which they were averaged was chosen to be large enough so that the stochastic fluctuations were
reduced to a satisfactory level (about 5000 for each value of T ).
E. Effect of multiple seeds
The effect of having multiple seeds due to different individuals being infected by mosquitoes can be investigated
using our formalism. In Sec. A, we define P as the probability that a random individual sparks an epidemic of size
S. If we assume that N such individuals have been independently infected by mosquitoes (i.e., they are sufficiently
far apart in the contact network), the probability that at least one of them sparks an epidemic is
PˆN = 1− (1− P )N . (S30)
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FIG. S4. Simulations using realistic data. The size of the extensive component, S, and the average size of microscopic
outbreaks, 〈s〉 are shown for the random network ensemble defined in Sec. F. These results confirm the general phenomenology
presented in the main text as well as the qualitative accuracy of the naive estimates of the upper and lower bounds of the
thresholds (black dotted vertical lines). Note that the distribution of the size of the small components follows a power law
on many orders of magnitude at the second transition. This obfuscates the position of the peak in practice for finite-size
networks. Based on Fig. 2 in the main text, we expect the peak to be slightly at the right of the line at T ' 0.69.
Moreover, since a fraction 1−P of all seeds are expected to not spark a macroscopic epidemic, N seeds are expected
to infect (1−P )N〈s〉 individuals in microscopic outbreaks. As N increases, we therefore expect a higher probability
of observing a macroscopic epidemic as well as more individuals infected in microscopic outbreaks. Figure S3 shows
the behavior of the quantity PˆN for the parameters used in Fig. S1. We see that although multiple seeds tend
to smooth the transition between the two thresholds with respect to the probability of sparking an epidemic, a
similar phenomenology is observed. More importantly, as shown in Ref. [11], the size of the epidemic is unaffected
by a finite number of seeds in the limit of large network size. In other words, having multiple seeds increases
the likelihood of reaching the extensive out-component, but it does not change its size. While this only maps to
vector transmission once a steady-state is achieved, it does suggest that the general phenomenology presented in
the main text is valid with or without vector transmission.
F. Simulations using realistic data
To further support our results, we simulated ZIKV transmission dynamics on a random network of sexual
contacts where the distribution of contacts are drawn from Ref. [5] (for homosexual contacts) and Ref. [7] (for
heterosexual contacts) but only using individuals with more than one sexual partner (as a rough approximation
of the sexually active population). A population of 106 individuals is assumed to be equally parted between men
and women, of which 5% are homosexuals, 3% are bisexuals and 92% are heterosexuals. We assume very few
individuals are infected by the mosquito vector, but they can cause outbreaks through sexual transmission where
men transmit with probability T and women with probability T/a. Using a = 2, Fig. S4 shows that increasing
heterogeneity in the distribution of the degrees does not alter the phenomenology presented in the main text.
Moreover, we see that the “naive” estimates described in the caption of Fig. 2 in the main text remain good
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indicators for the location of the two epidemic thresholds.
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